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Abstract: I study the rent market and the effects of rent control in Lisbon with a review 
on history of rent market laws and the unsuccessful rent actualizations, where the rent 
market represents 48% of the occupied dwellings, with old contracts representing circa 
70% of the rented, with an estimated gap between old and new contracts of 394€, 
according to a model based on the type and date of contract and other characteristics for 
each Lisbon Borough. Central borough presents high levels of old population and 
deterioration while Lisbon is reducing its housing park and population. 
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I. General Overview 
I study the Residential Rent Market in Lisbon, the most know city in Portugal and 
which is the typical case of an ancient town strongly facing the consequences of the rent 
control effects and perversions, such as outdated and very low levels of rent, with an 
estimated difference of 394€, population fixation, reduction and aging of the population, 
with more than 65 years old representing 24% of the total population,  lack of buildings’ 
maintenance, 55% of buildings needs maintenance, expropriation of property rights, 
lack of rent units’ supply an increase current market values, with the population pushed 
to own a house instead, about 12 percentage points more from 1991 to 2001 while the 
landlord and tenant’s relation was even seen as fight interests, instead of a conjugation 
of them. The rent market regulation was revised in 2005, with dwellings reevaluations 
and easing in evictions by lack of payment trying to solve the old low rents problems, 
but without great results, landlords doesn’t have the enough incentives to take the rent 
updates since it could represent more taxes, expenses obligation to do the maintenance 
of the building in change of phasing rent updates, up to 10 years. The strongly limiting 
and controlling laws,  imposed since the early of the century, as rent price limits, max 
actualization coefficients, eviction forbiddance,  intended to be temporary laws to 
regulate and stabilize the house market during the First War, as were applied in many 
other developed countries, but consequently extended in Portugal, which together with 
many changes in the direction rent laws, as political instability, depreciation of the 
Portuguese currency and periods of high inflation, brought a serious imbalance, inequity 
and inefficiency in the Portuguese house rent market, especially for Lisbon and Oporto 
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where the rents were frozen for longer periods, a problem with a difficult overcoming, 
whose extensions and effects are even felt nowadays
1
.  
For Portugal, to extend of my knowledge, there is any relevant literature or studies 
regarding this question, they are mainly about population and demography as studies 
from INE or about urban planning. So the purpose of this work is to present revealing 
data and show the deepness of the problem, analyzing the population, the rent market 
structure and the evolution of the rent market in Lisbon, studying the gaps in prices and 
house allocation, revealing indicators of misallocation, market and people stagnation 
and establishing a relation between the evidence of rent control and its indirect 
consequences, as far as possible for each distinct borough, and build a database with 
relevant data for the proposed analyze. 
The data is very limited, without any series of micro studies regarding urban house 
market, being restricted to the decennial census of population and housing from INE 
and also some series of indicators but without the geographic division needed and just 
for a few space of time, without a direct relation with the individual/families and theirs 
characteristics and the dwellings rented/owned where they live, the close approximation 
its by boroughs, with main data from the 2001 census. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Rent control is any imposition or restriction to the rent market causing impedance to 
attain the efficiency in detriment of another objective, as could be the transference of 
                                                 
1
 Accordingly to the data of European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 1994-2000, European 
Quality of Life Survey 2003 and 2007 (Portugal have high owing the dwelling percentage and low rent 
the dwelling percentage) and number eleven of the preamble of the Decree-Law nº 321-B/90 of 15
th
  
October which establishes the old RAU (Urban Rent Regime) now revoked by the Law n.º 6/2006 of 27
th
 
February which establishes the NRAU (New Urban Rent Regime) 
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the market’s surplus to the other party or to regulate some temporary market’s 
disturbance. Richard Arnott (1995) refers two types of rent control the “hard” or “first 
generation” taken during the periods of war which are the nominal rent freeze and the 
“second generation” that are “soft” but complex with allowable rent increases and 
regulated conversion, maintenance and relations. 
Miller, Benjamin and North (2009) exposed the cases of Santa Monica and New 
York City that is typical case of rent control. Cities where ruined houses can be found 
close to costly ones, because owners prefers to derelict the house once the rent couldn’t 
pay for maintenance, while new constructions is discouraged too, leading to a house 
gap, with families that can’t find a house, where others are underusing the houses that 
are paying for a low price, without subletting to another by a marginal price of the 
housing service, there are other large families that are living in small apartments since 
the market doesn’t have the enough freedom and flux to efficiently allocate the families, 
tenant mobility becomes restricted. As housing becomes a scarce good in the city, the 
vacancy rates are too low and landlord starts charging “key money”, with large amount 
up-front payment for new move in’s. Rent Control started to protect the market and low 
income people in periods of house scarcity or high levels of people mobility, as it’s the 
case of war times, but what we have now are many landlord that lost their right to profit 
from theirs properties while in many cases they are poorer than theirs tenant, , as the bid 
for house doesn’t work properly and prices are restricted who gets the house is who 
have more financial capacity to accomplish with the rent payments while the poorest 
ones becames excluded. Regarding the question of rent distribution Gale Johnson 
(1951) stated that “the vested interests of several million tenants will be so great, 
assuming continued inflation, that political pressures for it may be irresistible.”, also 
6 
 
the transfer of real income from landlords to tenants are made without regard to the 
income position of each ones, where the less mobile elements of the renting population 
have fared very well, while arriving families suffered real hardships and were forced to 
double-up in uncontrolled units, with prices increased by the impacts of rent controls. 
 Friedman and Stigler (1946), addressed the case of rent control in San Francisco 
where rent control difficult the allocation of the population in the post-war housing 
shortage in 1946, while in 1906 after an earthquake each house had to shelter 40 percent 
more people, but without rent control the city was rebuild quickly and after a month 
there wasn’t mention to a shortage problem. As the price rationing allows bidding up of 
rents, forcing the people to economize on space, there is always housing available for 
rent, incentives mobility and new construction, the market reacts and regulates by itself 
through the price system. The major criticism of the price system method is that “better 
quarters go to those who have larger incomes or more wealth”, but in fact rent control 
doesn’t solve the problem, because a man who has enough capital could purchase a 
desirable house in the free sales market , similarly the landlords would prefer to rent to 
the more wealthier to guarantee their payment, while big families have troubles to find a 
house whiles the house for rent becomes scarce and the spaces already rented are freely 
underused. Rent control implies workers loss of mobility, incentive to take in more 
persons and the allocated ones lost the incentive to move or double-up when they have 
more house service than they need. So, we could also think in inefficient allocation of 
the work force, affecting the productivity of the industry which could be a barrier for 
firms to entering in the market according to Cabral, Luis (2005). 
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003), explained the undersupply in the presence of rent 
controls, where the lower prices generates not only a loss of efficiency by lowering the 
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quantities offered, as well as part of the landlords surplus is transferred to consumers, 
which loses too some of their surplus, due to the haphazard and arbitrary allocation that 
distributes the housing service randomly or by favoritism, instead for whom valuates it 
most. Comparing New York renters and the characteristics of the house services rented 
with another free-market city with the same housing supply and demographic 
compositions, assuming that the demand would be constant across localities, they found 
a weak relation with the income of the families and the house rented and as more time 
the tenants are in a house the more misallocation can be found, not only by the reasons 
said before, also the tastes and conditions changes over time. 
Moon and Stotsky (1993) studied the effects of rent control on housing quality 
discussing the transference of surplus from landlords to assists low and moderate 
income families, where direct spending programs would be more efficient or equitable. 
They suggested that rent control lowers the quality of the rental housing because 
landlords have no incentives or financial capacity to do the maintenance of the building, 
although it can be offset, the low rents and the long stays incentives the tenants to do it. 
Olsen (1972) estimated the market rent according to the house characteristics, with a 
hedonic estimate for the price index, using rent decontrolled units and characteristics of 
the dwelling, building and neighborhood to determine the degree to which rent control 
suppresses rent below market levels. Then they linked the quality changes to the 
suppression of rent below the market levels, it was like a subsidy for tenants, as larger 
was the subsidy greater is the influence in housing quality. 
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III. A brief history of rent control in Portugal 
In 1867 the Civil Code saw rent as a temporary lease contract. In the beginning of 
the century the pressures with urbanization’s quick growth changed the rules and rents 
become frozen to control the price escalade. Later during the First World War rents 
were frozen for all existing and new contracts and established many restrictions to 
regulate and guarantee allocation to everyone in a period of intense mobility. 
The season was also marked by the devaluation of the Portuguese’s currency which 
together with the frozen rents brought imbalances in the rent market, with unreal, 
misallocated and outdated market values. 
In 1948 actualizations became frozen just for Lisbon and Oporto and in the eve of 
the Revolution of 1974 many of the rents are outdated since the first war. Meanwhile 
the old tenants’ benefit was being paid at higher rent costs by the new tenants, while the 
housing park began to deteriorate. Instituted the Democracy, the rent regime was even 
more depressed, with landlords seeing their rent incomes and the property rights 
strangled with rents frozen and compulsive contracts for the incontrollable occupations. 
Later started the attempts to rebuild the rent market discipline relieving some of the 
restrictions imposed, with special relevance to 1981 and 1985 when was regulated the 
free rent and conditional rents and stated the rent actualizations according to published 
coefficients. A pack of measures well accepted at the time which intended to avoid rent 
gaps and rent raises for new arrivals but with poor results due to the application of 
coefficients in to very low basis. In line, came in 1990 the Urban Rent Regime (RAU), 
extended in 1995 to the rents with commercial purpose, compiled the many laws and 
dispositions, with many corrections and framework reforms, intending to be a 
benchmark in the rent law and hoping to give to rent market a new dynamic. 
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Table 1 - Facts and Legislation from 1867 to 2006 
Period Facts and Legislation 
1867 - 1910 Civil Code 1867 
- Rent saw as temporary contract lease of mobility 
- Limited time contracts renewed if no one dismisses it 
- Free rent values 
- Evictions in case of tenants payment failure, bad use given or convenience 
of the landlord 
- Landlords obligated to do maintenance of the building 
- Transmissible to successors after decease 
- Disobedience crime in judicial decision eviction’s failure 
1910 - 1914 Implantation of the Republic on 5
th
 October of 1910 
Pressure with urbanization’s quick growth 
- Frozen rents for one year 
- Advance time requirements of renewals’ opposition 
1914 - 1918 First World War 
(Emergency provisions effective for a year after the peace treaty) 
- Rents frozen to all existing and new contracts 
- Obligation to rent derelict buildings 
- Evictions by landlord convenience forbidden  
1918 - 1926 After War – Devaluation of Portuguese’s currency 
(Outdated market values) 
- 1922: Rent actualizations according to matricidal taxable income and 
coefficients according to contact and building date (with no effects, also 
outdated and many rents was in foreign currency, latter was imposed the 
fixation to national currency) 
1926 - 1948 Started the Dictatorial Regime (1926-1974) 
- Complex rent actualizations based on matricidal values 
- Rent liberalizations to new vacant buildings and for tenants with another 
habitation 
- Allowed evictions by landlord convenience 
(rules suspended partially in 1928) 
-1940: Evaluations to commercial buildings allowing new rents in line 
1948 - 1966 Rents Frozen in Lisbon and Oporto 
- Expropriation for public utility 
- Caducity and transmission by divorce an decease regulated 
- Rent actualizations according to matricidal values and evaluations to correct 
them 
- Except Lisbon and Oporto: Rents frozen 
- 1957: Allowed contract rescission to works intended to increase the capacity 
of the dwelling 
1966 - 1974 Civil Code of 1966: 
(maintained many of the previous dispositions) 
- free rents to first or new contracts 
- evictions by landlords kept very restricted (non-temporary nature of rent 
contracts) 
- Rent actualizations up to the twelfth of matricidal value phased in 5 years 
with evaluations to correct it 
- Lisbon and Oporto rents kept frozen (in the eve of revolution many rents are 
outdated since the post-war) 
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1974 - 1976 Ended the Dictatorial Regime and Started the Democracy 
- Rents frozen to urban buildings 
- Suspension of evaluations and rent updates 
- Suspension of contract rescission for demolishing, expansion of the dwelling 
and landlord own residence 
- Obligation to rent and max rent values for old buildings 
- Heavy restrictions to Landlords with compulsive contracts for legalization of 
occupied (expropriated) dwellings 
- Measures to reallocate families in overload dwellings, injured by demolitions 
and the ones that couldn’t pay due to framework conditions 
- Right of preference for tenants’ cohabitants in new contracts 
1976 - 1985 An attempt to rebuild the rent market discipline 
- Allowed evictions for landlord own residence and in some others cases 
- Right of tenants to buy the dwellings for own residence 
- 1981: Established the free rent regime without rent updates and conditional 
rent regime limited to 7% of the twelfth of dwelling’s value and updatable 
according to an annual coefficient approved by the government 
- Revoked and reformulated the 1974 and 1975 dispositions 
- Extraordinary rent updates by evaluations kept suspended except for 
commercial rents and due to improvement works 
1985 - 1990 Law nº 46/85 – The Hope 
- Rent actualization for all rents according to published coefficients 
- Corrections for rents prior to 1980 by coefficients according to building 
condition and last update 
- Improvements works could be reflected in rents 
- Subside to compensate the rises in rent for low income tenants 
- Limited duration contracts 
1990 - 2006 RAU – Urban Rent Regime 
(Compilation of the many laws and dispositions, corrections of controversies 
and framework reforms) 
- Founded on 1985 precepts as contracts of limited duration 
- Seek private autonomy on rent actualizations 
- 1995: extended to commercial rents (DL nº 257/95) 
- 2000: Improvement works possibility for landlords or tenants and many 
others issues as rent updates, evictions, subsidies regulated 
 
 In 2006 came the New Urban Rent Regime (NRAU) where the preamble of its 
law project stating the same problems as the preamble of the revoked RAU, gives us an 
idea of the persistency of the rent issues and the inefficiency of the successive law 
revisions, intended to boost the paralyzed rent market, with many abandoned and 
crumbling buildings due to the low profitability of the old contracts and consequent lack 
of maintenance. With many persons forced to buy a house and running in high levels of 
household debt, low quality suburban housing and duplication of public infrastructures. 
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Table 2 - New Urban Rent Regime - NRAU 
General Rules 
(compilation, review, easing and simplification of the many laws and disposition) 
- Contracts simplified in Housing and Non-Housing 
- Regulates all the new and existing contracts 
- Rent updates according to annual coefficients published 
- Extrajudicial resolution in case of 3 months payment failure 
- Tenants can terminate any type of contract announcing it within 120 days 
- Penalties for derelict buildings 
Limited Duration Contracts Renovation and Termination 
- Initial period  ≥ 5 years and <30 years, renewed for periods of 3 years 
- Landlord could just oppose to renewal announcing it within 1 year advance 
Contracts prior to NRAU NEW Contracts 
Termination in Unlimited Duration Contracts 
- For landlord own residence, to demolish or to 
do improvement works announcing it within 6 
months of advance 
Condition: Tenant < 65 years 
                 or live there for less than 30 years 
    (those restrictions falls after transmission) 
- Landlord own residence, demolish or 
improvement works announcing it within 6 
months of advance or by convenience 
within 5 years of advance 
 
Transmission 
- Housing: spouse, sons, stepsons and persons 
residing in union with the tenant 
- Non-Housing: successors who explores the 
activity for more than 3 years 
- Housing: for spouse or people residing in 
union or common economy > 1 year 
- Non-Housing: successors if they didn’t 
renounce the transmission 
Transitory Rules for Contracts Prior to RAU and DL 257/95: 
Rent update: 
- Up to the twelfth of 4% of the value of the leased,  according to an evaluation in term of 
Municipal Property Taxation most recent than 3 years, multiplied by a factor of conservation 
from 0,5 to 1,2 according to conservation level in a scale of 1 to 5 
- Conservation level ≤ 2: rent can’t be raised, obligation to do improvement works  
- Tenants have the possibility to ask for evaluation and intimate the landlord to make 
improvement works or take the initiative of the works or even buy the dwelling 
- Rent subsidy for low income tenants 
 
Housing rent update phased: 
- 5 years: General rule 
- 10 years: tenants ≥ 65 years old, deficiency > 60% of incapacity 
                 or annual gross income < 5 annual minimum remunerations 
- 2 years: non-permanent residence or annual gross income > 15 annual min. remun. 
 
Non-Housing  rent update phased: 
- 5 years: General rule 
- 10 years: small companies, activity of public interest or in recovery areas 
- 0 years: closed, without activity or after some transmission cases. 
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IV. Findings 
To frame the analysis, let’s start to have a look over the evolution of the population 
since 1991 to 2009 in Portugal, Lisbon City and the peripheral municipalities of Lisbon 
that have a completely different behavior. Lisbon is the one that presents the greater 
decrease in population over time, with a special emphasis to the population with more 
than 65 years old that have decreased with more expression in 2001 and after 2005. 
 
Graph 1 - Population in Lisbon had decreased over time 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
 
Graph 2 - Lisbon has great levels of population with more than 65 years old 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
Annual Growth 
Mainland Total
Mainland ≥ 65 
Great Lisbon w/o Lisbon
City Total
Great Lisbon w/o Lisbon 
City ≥ 65 
Lisbon City Total
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
26%
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
≥ 65 years % of 
total 
Mainland ≥ 65 
North ≥ 65 
Center ≥ 65 
Great Lisbon w/o Lisbon 
City ≥ 65 
Lisbon City ≥ 65 
Alentejo ≥ 65 
Algarve ≥ 65 
13 
 
Lisbon is the City with the greater percentage of population with more than 65 
years for all the periods, but after 2005 is the only city in the area maintaining its level 
of older population, while all the others have maintained its high growth levels. 
As different regions and boroughs will be compared, the data will be presented as 
percentage of the total value for each geographic point to account for the different sizes. 
As Lisbon has 53 boroughs, I choose a few ones for each distinct type of borough such 
as Castelo, Santiago and Socorro, representing the boroughs from the hill of the Castle, 
where the old populations, low rent levels and low levels of population education are 
evident; Santa Justa, São Nicolau, Sacramento and Mártires representing the down-town 
of Lisbon, an area relatively more rich, with a bit higher levels of rent, but with high 
values of buildings crumbling; Encarnação and Santa Catarina, representing the known 
“Bairro Alto”, with high levels of old population; São Mamede representing a second 
line of boroughs around the center, where the effects of rent control aren’t so felt; 
Campo Grande and São Sebastião da Pedreira, representing a third line of boroughs, 
here the rents are relatively higher than in the other areas and where the rent units are 
being converted in Owner Occupied ones; Lumiar, Santa Maria dos Olivais and Marvila 
as peripheral areas, where predominates the owner occupied dwellings, very low rents 
and specially for the last one, high percentages of social rents. 
As rule for Lisbon, around 10% of the rent occupied units was being transformed in 
owner occupied units, with the great expression for Campo Grande and Santa Maria dos 
Olivais. For the peripheral areas the number of total dwellings increased, but the same 
doesn’t applies for the central boroughs, where the crumbling dwellings dictated a 
decrease in total occupied dwellings with almost none counterpart in owner occupied 
dwellings increase. 
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Graph 3 - Lisbon decrease in Rented and Total Occupied Dwellings (1991 to 2001) 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
 
 
Graph 4 - Owner Occupied are taking the position to Rent Occupied Dwellings, 
Central Boroughs still have a high percentage of unlimited duration rent contracts 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
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Lisbon is the place where are less people living in an owner occupied dwelling, so 
it’s the place that could be more affected with rent law changes, but is also the place 
where the percentage of owner occupied dwellings growth more from 1991 to 2001. 
The boroughs of the Castle Hill are the ones that present the higher percentage of rented 
units, close to 70% and 80% of the total occupied units, where the unlimited duration 
rents represents 80% to 90% of the total rented units. For “Bairro Alto” and Down 
Town, the expression of rented units is not so high, and the unlimited duration contracts 
have a bit lower percentage. Very different are the case of peripheral boroughs with 
high percentages of owner occupied dwellings and where social rent represents a higher 
percentage of the rented units. 
 
Table 3 – In 2001 Lisbon rents are strongly pushed to very low values with 75% of 
the contracts with values above the mean and 70% of contracts prior to 1986  
Geographic Unit: Mean rent: Median rent: 
Mainland 
North 
Center 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
123 € 
114 € 
135 € 
97 € 
165 € 
59,86 € to 99,75 € 
59,86 € to 99,75 € 
99,76 € to 149,63 € 
34,92 € to 59,85 € 
99,76 € to 149,63 € 
Great Lisbon w/o Lisbon City 148 € 59,86 € to 99,75 € 
  
Lisbon 126 € 34,92 € to 59,85 € 
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Castelo 54 € 14,96 € to 24,93 € 
  
São Nicolau 127 € 34,92 € to 59,85 € 
  
Marvila 55 € 24,94 € to 34,91 € 
  
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
 
 
In terms of contracted rent values, Lisbon region was in 2001 one of the lowers 
median levels in the country, just surpassed by Alentejo. Lisbon city compared with the 
Great Lisbon without Lisbon has a first, second and third quartile of rent values 
generally in lower rent values than the others and an average rent level strictly above. 
Although compared to other areas, Lisbon as average rent level close to the mean of 
Mainland, which means that Lisbon as an high percentage of very low rents, but also 
some rents with high rent values. 
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The gap is even greater if we look inside the boroughs of Lisbon, where for central 
ones the quartiles correspond to very low levels of rent. Especially for the Castle 
borough, which has the lowest mean and median, where the rents before 1975 
represents 70% of the rent contracts and are pushing the rents for very low levels. For 
the Down-Town boroughs such as São Nicolau, the composition are similar to the 
Lisbon average, with 50% of rent contracts prior to 1975, but pushing the rents for bit 
higher level, with the contracts after 1991 pushing the rents to higher levels. We can 
notice the difference between the older and the newest contracts. For peripheral 
boroughs such as Marvilla, the values of the rents are very low, due to the quality and 
type of constructions in the area and also the social rent contracts, so each period of rent 
contracts are distributed for all levels of rent in a close proportion. 
 
Table 4 - High levels of old population, living with no family and having very low 
levels of education in the central boroughs in 2001 
 
Non-
nuclear 
families 
One person 
families  
with ≥ 65 
years old 
Populatio
n ≥ 65 
year old 
population 
without aca
demic 
qualification 
Population 
with 
higher 
education 
Population 
living with 
pension % 
Mainland 19.28% 8.87% 16.50% 11.38% 6.61% 20.20% 
North 14.89% 6.94% 13.96% 12.06% 5.22% 17.90% 
Center 19.34% 10.52% 19.45% 12.97% 5.29% 23.08% 
Alentejo 21.30% 12.52% 22.34% 11.68% 4.46% 26.46% 
Algarve 23.28% 9.54% 18.63% 11.19% 5.68% 20.75% 
Grat Lisbon w/o Lisbon 20.46% 6.58% 12.61% 8.91% 9.58% 16.00% 
Lisbon City 34.22% 14.38% 23.61% 8.47% 17.18% 26.30% 
Campo Grande 35.24% 16.88% 28.57% 7.72% 18.57% 28.66% 
Castelo 42.70% 24.20% 30.66% 10.56% 5.28% 37.31% 
Encarnação 50.16% 20.07% 26.68% 9.59% 11.50% 29.20% 
Lumiar 25.94% 5.98% 12.61% 7.01% 30.71% 14.89% 
Mártires 53.33% 13.33% 23.46% 11.73% 18.77% 21.11% 
Marvila 17.30% 7.29% 13.70% 11.72% 3.60% 20.24% 
Sacramento 55.16% 19.51% 24.43% 9.20% 16.25% 27.16% 
Santa Catarina 47.00% 20.23% 28.45% 9.02% 10.32% 32.05% 
Santa Justa 49.40% 21.39% 32.43% 11.14% 6.29% 32.57% 
Santiago 41.45% 21.50% 31.62% 11.20% 10.50% 34.42% 
São Mamede 46.29% 18.87% 27.93% 7.26% 26.73% 28.30% 
São Miguel 42.60% 19.74% 26.06% 11.82% 3.60% 32.58% 
São Nicolau 53.72% 22.87% 32.51% 8.68% 9.11% 32.94% 
São Sebastião da Pedreira 43.87% 18.07% 29.26% 6.78% 29.23% 24.37% 
Socorro 45.97% 20.08% 25.94% 12.71% 4.71% 30.88% 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from Census 2001 - INE 
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The consequences are evident, the boroughs with higher values of rented units, 
unlimited duration rent contracts and high percentages of old contracts have higher 
values for indicators such as the percentage of non-nuclear families, most evident for 
the Down-Town boroughs, while the Castle Hill presents high values of population with 
more than 65 years old and high percentages of families of just one person with more 
than 65 years old, also high levels of people living with pension. For third line boroughs 
such as Campo Grande, the level of old population is high, although presenting an lower 
level for one person families with more than 65 years old, which means that despite 
having an high level of old population, they are living in family, maybe because, many 
of the houses there are owner occupied instead. Relatively to education level, the central 
boroughs present high levels of population without academic qualification, although 
Down-Town and “Bairro Alto” also have high levels of population with higher 
education. It gives us an idea of the fixation of old population, but also that different 
population with different backgrounds was searching the area. 
Despite being areas of services and commerce, the population of “Bairro Alto” and 
Down-Town, are not enjoying living in the same borough where they work, the levels 
are above the Lisbon mean, and for boroughs of Castle Hill the levels are even lower. 
Also revealing the fixation of population and especially for the Castle Hill, are the level 
of individuals living in the same borough since 1995 and individuals natural from the 
borough where they live, for other central boroughs those values aren’t so expressive. 
Regarding the occupation of the dwellings, the situations differs for each type of 
boroughs where for Castle Hill and Marvila where the rent level is two low, according 
to the index of lack of divisions, computed by the percentage of dwellings with 
divisions in lack times the number of divisions in lack, people are overusing the 
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occupied units. While for Down Town and third line boroughs, people are using 
dwellings with divisions in excess. 
 
 
Table 5 - Population Fixation and high percentages of Derelict Buildings in the 
central boroughs, Divisions in lack or Excess 
 
Working 
or 
studying 
in the 
same 
borough 
Natural 
from the 
borough 
where 
actually 
live 
Individual 
that live in 
the same 
borough 
since 1995 
Index of 
divisions 
in excess 
Index of 
divisions 
in lack 
Partially 
derelict as 
% of 2001 
total 
buildings 
Totally 
derelict as 
% of 2001 
total 
buildings 
Buildings 
needing 
repairs 
2001 
Mainland 24.88% 47.92% 78.88% 0.95 0.22 
  
38.10% 
North 24.44% 53.17% 79.34% 0.91 0.21 
  
40.40% 
Center 27.56% 59.14% 82.52% 1.21 0.12 
  
37.30% 
Alentejo 30.67% 57.16% 84.04% 1.01 0.15 
  
35.10% 
Algarve 35.21% 43.52% 76.98% 0.88 0.19 
  
32.80% 
Grat Lisbon w/o Lisbon 20.47% 27.58% 72.16% 0.71 0.21 
  
36.18% 
Lisbon City 15.35% 26.73% 77.22% 0.99 0.17 5.27% 3.52% 55.90% 
Campo Grande 17.08% 24.05% 74.67% 1.27 0.12 0.48% 1.75% 36.30% 
Castelo 6.81% 47.36% 90.12% 0.43 0.30 8.85% 7.96% 25.60% 
Encarnação 15.93% 26.15% 76.52% 1.10 0.16 1.72% 3.02% 61.40% 
Lumiar 17.03% 21.99% 69.02% 0.94 0.13 0.53% 1.44% 38.90% 
Mártires 17.89% 26.69% 72.73% 1.56 0.14 26.67% 21.67% 61.60% 
Marvila 19.84% 33.03% 82.27% 0.62 0.26 7.13% 4.39% 68.70% 
Sacramento 15.57% 23.64% 68.98% 1.11 0.14 14.62% 2.31% 74.60% 
Santa Catarina 12.72% 28.38% 79.20% 1.01 0.17 2.45% 4.29% 77.10% 
Santa Justa 12.43% 19.00% 78.00% 1.09 0.15 43.92% 14.19% 78.30% 
Santiago 9.68% 33.37% 87.40% 0.92 0.19 24.40% 4.17% 54.70% 
São Mamede 13.72% 22.73% 73.68% 1.51 0.11 17.56% 6.54% 39.00% 
São Nicolau 11.91% 20.51% 73.62% 1.46 0.11 25.62% 6.20% 57.40% 
São Sebastião da Pedreira 18.99% 28.67% 75.95% 1.84 0.14 18.23% 4.70% 52.80% 
Socorro 12.56% 31.21% 81.79% 0.75 0.26 4.42% 2.72% 80.70% 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from Census 2001 – INE; 
             Derelict buildings from Direcção Municipal de Conservação e Reabilitação Urbana 
 
It's evident for Down-Town, there are high levels of buildings crumbling or 
partially derelict, for Castle Hill, the value isn’t so expressive, maybe because, the 
construction is more horizontal than vertical in the area, and as the rent values are 
lower, people are more responsible for their rented unit and have more incentive to 
make the maintenance of the building than the owner. Those values are somewhat in 
line with the percentage of buildings needing repair in 2001. 
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Graph 5 - Rent Actualizations Grew above the Price index since 1980, Price index 
Grew 50% and 185% more 
 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from  INE. 
Actualization coefficients computed from factors in “Portal Habitação” 
 
Rent actualizations was allowed in 1981 for conditional rent, while the free rent 
regime doesn’t have, the situation was corrected in 1985 when was stated the 
actualization for all contracts, although the free rents had already missed the 
actualizations in a period of high inflation, nevertheless the free rents could be less 
outdate at the time than the conditional rent. Even so the index of actualization since 
1980 was above the price index for the same period and if we go back a while the 
difference is enormous. The reason for comparing the price index with the next year 
actualization index is because it is the one that incorporates the previous year inflation. 
Extraordinary rent actualizations where stated to correct the prior to 1980 contracts, 
to the current date, at the time 1986, and then were update according to the annual 
coefficients published. But those factors aren’t in line with the inflation index from the 
same year until 1986. And the value of the factor for the first year was in farthest years 
about half of the factor in this table and in the next years the update is done according to 
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one plus half of the annual coefficient published. The actualization became well short of 
the necessary. 
 
Graph 6 - For contracts prior to 1980 the extraordinary actualization was 
insufficient for the early years, for the farthest the factor to apply in the first year 
was about half of the global factor 
Global correction coefficients to apply in 1986 
 
year of last 
rent fixation  
Municipalities of Lisbon and Oporto 
Others 
Municipalities 
Inflation 
Index 
Until 1986 
w/o gate 
and w/o lift 
w/o gate 
and w/ lift 
w/ gate and 
w/o lift 
w/ gate and 
w/ lift 
Before 1955 6.51 7.15 7.79 8.42 
3.48 
 
1995 to 1959 5.98 6.51 7.05 7.57 
 
1960 5.58 6.04 6.49 6.49 
 
1961 4.9 5.22 5.54 5.86 4.091 
1962 4.63 4.9 5.16 5.42 4.077 
1963 4.62 4.89 5.14 5.4 4.07 
1964 4.35 4.5 4.77 4.97 4.064 
1965 3.97 4.12 4.28 4.43 4.044 
1966 3.43 3.51 3.59 3.67 4.005 
1967 3.18 3.952 
1968 2.99 3.913 
1969 2.94 3.46 3.896 
1970 2.65 3.12 3.822 
1971 2.64 3.11 3.804 
1972 2.52 2.97 3.754 
1973 2.32 2.73 3.676 
1974 2.12 2.24 3.581 
1975 1.65 1.65 3.392 
1976 1.47 1.47 3.23 
1977 1.31 1.31 3.067 
1978 1.27 1.27 2.793 
1979 1.21 1.21 2.573 
Source:  Inflation Index Author Computations based on Inflation excluding Housing Data from INE 
until 1977, before from Inflation Data from Google. 
Actualization coefficients from Law nº 46/86 
 
 
Although growing in line with price index since 1987, actualization index grew 
above the CI index, which accounts for the growth of the House market prices, also 
above the conservation costs, so if the rent was insufficient to cover the costs, then it 
became worse. 
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Graph 7 - Rent Actualizations Grew in line with the Price index since 1987, but 
above the House market index and Conservation costs 
 
Source: Price Index and Conservation Costs - Author Computations based on Data from  INE. 
Actualization coefficients computed from factors in “Portal Habitação” 
CI index Author computations based on data from Confidencial Imobiliário 
 
 
I will explain next is how the characteristics of the dwellings, boroughs, buildings 
and contracts could explain the average rent price and the accumulated percentage of 
buildings up to each rent level. Regressing for each corresponding rent level and the 
average the accumulate percentage of usual classic familiar residence rented or 
subleased dwellings falling before that level for each borough (53 observations). I used 
this method because I don’t have a detailed data, just the number of contracts falling in 
each rent level for each borough, so I can’t estimate a hedonic price model for the 
controlled and uncontrolled market, instead I’ve to estimate both together and verify 
whether having a greater percentage of old and unlimited contracts influences the 
number of houses falling before each rent quartile.  The idea is to evaluate how the 
explanatory variables influence the accumulate level of dwellings falling before that 
rent level, so as great is the accumulate percentage for that level the more dwellings are 
falling before that rent level, so lower will be the rent (an increase in accumulate value 
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is equal to a decrease in rents value). Accordingly as higher is the accumulate value 
compared to other boroughs, the lower are the rents in that borough. 
 
Table 6 - Model for the average borough rent value based on rent type, buildings’ 
date and nº of dwellings, nº of divisions and contract date, Graph with coefficients 
based on the same model for each accumulated level of rent percentage 
    mean t-scores 
Constant 33.92 0.644 
% of rent and 
sublet occupied as 
usual residence 
Limited Duration 298.12 4.082 
Social Rent -103.45 -3.581 
Sublet 60.47 0.272 
% of buildings by 
building date 
Prior to 1919 21.19 0.899 
1919 to 1945 37.53 1.905 
1946 to 1960 40.59 1.533 
1960 to 1970 89.30 2.480 
1971 to 1980 -24.15 -0.853 
1981 to 1990 164.81 2.497 
% of buildings by 
nº of dwellings 
5 to 9 Dwellings 0.00 0.000 
10 to 15 Dwel. 101.19 2.688 
> 15 Dwellings 12.54 0.254 
% of occupied as 
usual residence 
3 to 4 Divisions 25.62 0.627 
5 to 6 Divisions 108.34 3.579 
7 to 8 Divisions 91.91 0.962 
9 or more Div. 288.63 2.311 
% of occupied as 
usual residence 
dwellings by 
contract date 
Prior to 1975 -95.88 -2.302 
1975 to 1986 -27.18 -0.574 
1987 to 1991 154.41 0.896 
  R2 0.9406   
  Adjusted R2 0.9064   
 
 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from INE 
 
Each explanatory variable was expressed as percentage of the total of the belonging 
group, with different values for each borough, where each group has an omitted 
variable, so each of the coefficients should be compared with the omitted variable. So 
what we have is that an percentage point increase in the limited duration rent contracts, 
will increase the average rent by 2.98 €. If we imagine an universe of one unlimited rent 
with a contract prior to 1976, updating it for an limited rent in those days, the rent 
should be 298.12€ plus 95.88€, 394€ higher. In the graph we have the same model 
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applied to the percentage of houses falling before each rent level, where we can see that 
the contracts prior to 1975 are influencing the rent for contracts in lower levels of rent, 
while the limited duration rent contracts, with value closer to the market, are pushing 
the rents for higher values. Higher rent levels could be attained by transforming the 
contracts prior to 1975 in unlimited contracts, being more effective pushing the rent for 
levels greater than 24,94 € since many of the previous are explained by social rent 
contracts. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Old rent control laws established the rules on today rent market. Lisbon being one 
of expensive Portuguese cities, have high percentage of actual rent contracts falling in 
very low levels of monthly rent, and the results are known, the center of the cities is 
crumbling as owners don’t have incentive and economical capacity to keep subsidizing 
the old tenant with perverted and outdated rent contracts. Where to update the value of 
rents the landlords, already without economic capacity have to make the needing repairs 
and even revaluated its property in terms of municipal tax payment, to account for a 5 or 
more probably 10 years phased rent update, due to high percentage individuals with 
more than 65 years. 
Landlords are sawing their property rights expropriated, without capacity to avoid 
the dilapidation and crumbling of their “valuable” goods. The NRAU was insufficient to 
solve the problems of the outdated rents, according to a recent news of Jornal de 
Negócios on 30
th
 May, estimated that just 2000 rents were updated according to the 
reevaluation provided by the NRAU, a very small number, due to the bureaucracy of the 
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processes, municipal taxes increases in line with the reevaluation, high phasing time of 
the update and the landlord could be obligated to do maintenance works before 
increasing the rent. 
Sawing the question in the other way, currently it’s easier to evict a tenant due to 
the non-payment of the rents or even to do structural works in the building. But the lack 
of rent units in the market, also established high prices for new contracts, having a look 
to currently square meter price for rent from CI data, the most inflicted by the rent 
controls boroughs are the ones where the prices are higher, such as Down-Town and 
Castle which is leading the table, a contrast with the very low rents evidenced. It is just 
to say that evicted tenants don’t have an alternative. 
The solution which I propose, in line with the agreement with the “Troika”, is to 
obligate evaluations and rent updates, with subsidies to tenants instead of phasing 
updates. The equality in the rent market should be restored and it will allow the 
convergence of the high prices charged in the market lowering them as well the old 
lower rents converge to higher values and then the market should work by itself 
An efficient rent market could even be part of the solution for the Portuguese crisis, 
many families are indebted with the purchase of own house and then the increase of the 
interest rates. It was even a point of debate in April 2011 by the IMF, increasing the 
house prices (for sell) and liberalizes the rent market to stop the indebtedness of the 
families. Creating an alternative for the families, stimulating the mobility and cleaning 
the image of a long landlord and tenant relation of conflicts. 
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Note 1 - For Further Studies 
It will be interesting to analyze again when the data for census 2011 where released. The expected 
result for 2011 is a decrease in limited rent contract effect since they become more usual and with more 
weight while Unlimited rent contracts should became more close to the market conditions and to 
evaluation of the dwellings. With the date of contract becoming less related with the unlimited rent 
contract and so more expressive in explaining the lower rent levels. 
It will be also interesting to analyze the effects of rent control losses on the population’s mobility, 
unsound and derelict buildings and current market prices. Also the especial rent updates in terms of the 
NRAU, analyzing the amplitude of rent update according to the conditions of the contract, I asked this 
data, but I had no answer. 
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Annex II - Map of Lisbon Boroughs 
 
 
Source: SOL   
Annex III 
Lisbon decrease in Rented and Total Occupied Dwellings 
 
 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
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Annex V  
Percentage of Owner and Rent Occupied Dwellings, 
Percentage Point Variation and Total Occupied Dwelling 
Variation from 1991 to 2001 
 
 
 Occupied 
Dwellings 
Weight in 2001 
(% of Lisbon - 
Value: 221868) 
Owner Occupied Dwellings Total 
Occupied 
Dwelling 
Variation 
(%) 
Rent Occupied Dwellings 
Geographic Unit 
Weight 
1991 
(%) 
Weight 
2001 
(%) 
Variation 
of the 
weight 
(P.P.)   
Variation 
of the 
weight 
(P.P.) 
Weight 
1991 
(%) 
Weight 
2001 
(%) 
Mainland 1537 64.21 75.38 11.17 16.39 -7.12 27.74 20.62 
Noth 532 60.97 73.62 12.65 20.74 -7.76 29.36 21.60 
Center 373 78.41 85.25 6.84 12.39 -3.13 15.06 11.93 
Alentejo 128 68.08 79.58 11.50 5.11 -6.22 21.10 14.88 
Algarve 64 66.59 75.70 9.11 24.92 -4.46 23.34 18.89 
Great Lisbon w/o 
Lisbon City 
221 61.14 72.73 11.59 25.96 -8.47 32.49 24.02 
Lisbon City 100 33.83 47.91 14.08 -2.53 -11.70 59.42 47.72 
Ajuda 3.19 33.66 47.93 14.28 -8.67 -13.25 61.72 48.47 
Alcântara 2.81 32.73 41.42 8.68 -13.54 -6.39 61.27 54.88 
Alto do Pina 1.87 41.96 54.80 12.84 9.03 -9.10 49.44 40.34 
Alvalade 1.90 35.70 44.82 9.13 -2.48 -7.08 56.06 48.98 
Ameixoeira 1.57 41.79 52.51 10.72 2.08 -6.12 50.91 44.79 
Anjos 1.89 28.62 39.97 11.36 -13.62 -11.03 66.05 55.02 
Beato 2.59 34.05 38.70 4.64 -0.42 -2.36 59.98 57.62 
Benfica 7.48 48.24 60.51 12.27 3.59 -8.33 43.38 35.05 
Campo Grande 1.98 17.25 59.91 42.66 7.72 -42.45 77.00 34.54 
Campolide 2.78 34.28 41.87 7.59 -16.61 -0.55 54.55 54.01 
Carnide 2.83 49.98 50.99 1.02 52.72 4.12 41.04 45.16 
Castelo 0.12 7.27 11.65 4.38 -19.39 -3.46 90.30 86.84 
Charneca 1.13 28.39 20.38 -8.01 15.89 16.37 59.89 76.26 
Coração de Jesus 0.84 34.11 39.72 5.61 -9.85 -2.85 57.21 54.36 
Encarnação 0.62 17.48 30.48 13.00 19.83 -13.51 79.04 65.53 
Graça 1.34 27.75 31.95 4.20 -11.94 -2.20 67.88 65.69 
Lapa 1.60 29.01 40.30 11.29 -10.94 -9.97 63.70 53.74 
Lumiar 6.11 54.52 72.71 18.19 28.94 -13.86 36.79 22.92 
Madalena 0.07 3.24 15.53 12.28 -12.97 -15.49 91.89 76.40 
Mártires 0.06 9.30 26.61 17.31 -3.88 -19.20 83.72 64.52 
Marvila 5.35 14.97 24.95 9.99 0.41 -6.82 79.61 72.80 
Mercês 1.00 22.02 32.49 10.47 -8.03 -9.76 73.26 63.50 
Nossa Sra. de Fátima 2.83 31.15 47.09 15.94 -6.83 -14.83 60.87 46.04 
Pena 1.17 17.33 28.62 11.29 -9.64 -8.68 75.93 67.25 
Penha de França 2.70 31.24 45.46 14.22 -10.53 -12.93 63.90 50.97 
Prazeres 1.47 42.34 38.93 -3.41 -12.13 4.98 51.85 56.83 
Sacramento 0.18 22.40 35.19 12.79 -8.78 -14.29 72.52 58.23 
Santa Catarina 0.81 14.16 25.71 11.54 -8.38 -10.75 81.17 70.42 
Santa Engrácia 1.16 24.42 39.58 15.16 -10.49 -13.05 70.13 57.08 
Santa Isabel 1.41 26.82 38.11 11.29 -11.39 -10.07 66.54 56.47 
Santa Justa 0.13 18.37 20.34 1.97 -33.11 0.54 74.38 74.92 
Santa Maria de Belém 1.72 42.94 50.24 7.30 -8.61 -6.67 51.48 44.80 
Santa Maria dos 
Olivais 
7.75 42.69 72.49 29.79 10.07 -28.49 53.39 24.90 
Santiago 0.17 12.13 15.28 3.15 -21.97 -2.63 83.05 80.43 
Santo Condestável 3.46 28.44 39.38 10.94 -8.57 -9.00 64.93 55.92 
Santo Estêvão 0.45 28.69 22.52 -6.17 -25.56 6.07 68.41 74.47 
Santos-o-Velho 0.78 21.51 28.37 6.86 -19.41 -6.42 73.59 67.17 
S.Cristóvão 
S.Lourenço 
0.35 15.46 20.15 4.69 -21.79 -1.38 78.01 76.64 
S. Domingos de 
Benfica 
6.13 48.33 62.53 14.20 11.97 -11.33 43.38 32.06 
São Francisco Xavier 1.38 69.48 73.89 4.41 6.13 -3.26 23.03 19.78 
São João 3.03 31.82 44.64 12.82 -14.80 -9.50 61.36 51.86 
São João de Brito 2.47 35.12 49.13 14.01 -5.78 -13.73 58.48 44.75 
São João de Deus 2.12 27.80 40.52 12.72 -10.57 -11.71 64.48 52.77 
São Jorge de Arroios 3.43 27.43 39.58 12.15 -16.12 -9.86 64.49 54.64 
São José 0.66 16.96 28.38 11.42 -16.85 -10.02 77.82 67.80 
São Mamede 1.14 23.88 36.92 13.04 -6.92 -10.46 67.18 56.72 
São Miguel 0.36 11.29 17.62 6.33 -22.87 -4.51 84.78 80.27 
São Nicolau 0.21 6.55 24.19 17.64 -13.30 -16.47 88.39 71.92 
São Paulo 0.67 17.50 25.47 7.97 -14.10 -5.94 76.91 70.98 
S. Sebastião Pedreira 1.10 21.20 44.33 23.13 -16.76 -20.66 68.60 47.95 
São Vicente de Fora 0.87 17.74 27.89 10.14 -10.60 -9.43 78.29 68.87 
Sé 0.23 12.09 23.93 11.84 -23.28 -11.09 82.69 71.60 
Socorro 0.52 14.48 23.75 9.27 -32.40 -8.83 83.01 74.18 
 
Source: Author computation based on data from INE 
 
  
 
Annex VI 
Accumulated percentage of Dwellings by monthly rent value 
in 2001 (€) 
 
 
less 
than 
14,96 
14,96 
to 
24,93 
24,94 
to 
34,91 
34,92 
to 
59,85 
59,86 
to 
99,75 
99,76 
to 
149,63 
149,64 
to 
199,51 
199,52 
to 
249,39 
249,40 
to 
299,27 
299,28 
to 
399,03 
399,04 
to 
498,79 
Average 
monthly 
rent (€) 
Mainland 15.81 25.53 34.52 48.24 59.38 68.47 76.72 83.51 89.11 95.80 98.11 123 
North 15.30 24.58 33.99 45.99 57.07 68.89 79.49 87.43 93.01 98.17 99.31 114 
Center 15.46 23.07 29.58 38.83 47.94 59.53 71.78 82.31 90.53 97.81 99.39 135 
Lisbon 14.78 25.75 35.58 53.32 66.04 72.06 76.76 80.98 85.17 92.63 96.35 126 
Alentejo 27.40 37.99 46.23 57.16 65.79 74.49 82.24 88.36 93.20 97.91 99.26 97 
Algarve 14.42 21.81 28.46 37.79 44.58 50.83 59.61 69.46 81.13 95.46 98.53 165 
Great Lisbon w/o Lisbon 11.23 21.02 31.28 46.94 58.57 64.17 69.51 74.93 80.76 91.81 96.61 148 
Lisbon City 15.01 25.16 33.87 55.34 71.38 78.63 82.52 85.23 87.51 91.30 94.56 118 
Ajuda 18.90 35.82 46.69 72.01 81.36 85.21 88.38 90.62 92.66 95.97 98.45 81 
Alcântara 13.64 23.00 33.53 61.34 75.84 80.74 84.55 86.97 89.10 92.76 96.22 106 
Alto do Pina 6.87 17.03 25.43 52.20 69.35 76.34 80.04 82.03 84.50 87.90 91.96 136 
Alvalade 2.82 6.70 14.88 42.78 65.89 76.22 79.95 82.58 84.11 87.13 90.96 147 
Ameixoeira 32.00 42.33 51.53 68.44 76.08 79.65 82.59 86.98 90.23 95.80 98.06 91 
Anjos 7.36 16.58 24.96 46.02 66.33 74.53 78.47 81.22 84.48 88.75 93.95 138 
Beato 19.16 31.35 41.62 64.97 77.04 81.48 84.16 86.69 88.61 93.64 97.53 99 
Benfica 8.16 18.76 27.41 56.28 74.67 80.26 82.94 84.97 86.91 90.73 94.90 118 
Campo Grande 7.90 12.86 18.60 35.44 73.37 81.79 85.05 87.14 88.84 90.73 92.89 126 
Campolide 16.85 27.02 36.84 55.07 68.39 77.04 82.74 86.59 88.83 92.65 95.97 114 
Carnide 30.75 44.10 53.25 71.58 84.56 90.33 94.02 95.58 96.28 97.39 98.05 64 
Castelo 35.06 56.28 68.40 80.09 86.58 90.91 92.21 94.81 97.40 98.70 98.70 54 
Charneca 26.08 41.50 50.43 63.98 74.78 83.16 88.38 92.95 96.25 99.59 100.0 75 
Coração de Jesus 6.90 15.06 23.71 41.69 65.01 74.44 80.56 83.97 86.01 89.89 92.81 138 
Encarnação 13.17 23.00 34.13 51.84 64.04 70.52 75.92 79.37 83.05 90.17 95.25 136 
Graça 16.46 26.98 37.04 59.86 73.42 78.56 82.57 85.37 87.35 92.07 96.34 111 
Lapa 9.25 18.96 25.55 44.05 63.52 72.92 77.16 79.71 81.81 85.39 88.71 155 
Lumiar 23.84 29.32 34.76 51.81 65.43 73.84 77.28 79.94 81.70 84.29 87.08 150 
Madalena 12.70 23.02 32.54 42.86 60.32 69.05 73.81 78.57 82.54 88.89 93.65 147 
Mártires 4.94 9.88 22.22 39.51 58.02 70.37 76.54 81.48 83.95 86.42 91.36 155 
Marvila 30.79 45.05 55.26 72.94 85.43 91.98 95.56 97.25 98.19 99.09 99.59 55 
Mercês 13.53 23.80 35.25 53.30 66.83 74.32 78.42 82.44 85.84 89.94 94.17 129 
Nossa Sra. de Fátima 5.22 10.84 17.18 40.30 60.62 70.54 76.24 79.17 81.62 85.54 89.12 161 
Pena 12.89 23.37 32.06 48.93 62.50 69.11 73.49 77.19 81.84 89.18 93.50 146 
Penha de França 13.23 23.81 31.62 56.21 73.15 77.93 81.09 83.64 85.64 91.13 96.45 118 
Prazeres 18.53 30.24 39.72 59.42 73.38 79.13 82.85 84.88 87.49 91.75 94.46 113 
Sacramento 9.02 20.08 31.15 49.18 54.92 67.21 72.95 76.64 80.33 88.11 93.44 154 
Santa Catarina 13.78 27.55 37.69 54.02 66.10 72.29 76.32 80.88 85.29 91.10 95.90 128 
Santa Engrácia 11.68 21.03 31.84 59.61 70.89 75.37 78.44 81.31 84.05 91.99 97.40 121 
Santa Isabel 11.55 20.28 27.73 46.46 64.64 73.43 78.18 81.88 84.86 88.73 92.21 140 
Santa Justa 18.58 30.09 44.25 59.29 74.78 80.09 82.74 84.96 88.50 93.81 97.35 104 
Santa Maria de Belém 16.17 27.01 36.58 65.04 76.64 81.86 84.64 86.78 89.28 92.06 95.13 105 
Santa Maria dos Olivais 24.40 39.00 49.19 68.01 80.17 87.23 90.37 92.80 93.95 95.53 97.23 79 
Santiago 17.21 32.47 42.21 66.23 79.87 85.39 88.64 91.23 93.51 96.10 97.73 84 
Santo Condestável 14.21 22.79 29.96 50.79 70.09 76.96 80.15 82.52 85.10 89.48 93.29 130 
Santo Estêvão 25.07 40.50 51.72 64.38 74.14 79.82 84.96 89.45 93.27 97.36 99.21 86 
Santos-o-Velho 17.67 28.66 39.39 57.31 70.75 77.77 81.83 84.28 86.73 91.80 94.93 116 
S. Cristóvão e S. 
Lourenço 23.15 35.47 43.35 59.93 68.47 73.89 79.80 85.22 89.49 94.58 96.55 110 
São Domingos de 
Benfica 5.55 12.04 19.26 50.86 68.22 76.03 78.69 81.10 82.61 86.83 91.84 143 
São Francisco Xavier 4.40 7.01 9.79 29.20 51.71 65.58 67.86 70.47 72.27 75.53 78.96 214 
São João 10.15 19.29 28.45 56.40 73.99 79.45 82.65 85.04 87.35 92.13 96.51 114 
São João de Brito 5.97 11.97 20.76 48.37 70.70 76.74 81.74 83.43 85.13 88.19 91.09 137 
São João de Deus 2.23 6.46 11.97 28.80 57.88 72.80 77.78 80.73 83.01 85.96 88.71 165 
São Jorge de Arroios 5.57 13.36 19.66 38.54 60.57 72.18 77.17 80.18 82.55 86.29 91.09 155 
São José 9.94 20.68 30.12 49.50 64.31 71.47 75.84 79.22 83.50 90.95 95.33 137 
São Mamede 7.26 13.76 20.60 39.70 58.18 68.45 72.96 76.18 78.51 82.34 85.56 177 
São Miguel 24.39 37.12 47.24 62.27 70.09 77.45 82.36 86.66 93.40 97.24 98.62 95 
São Nicolau 7.44 18.75 30.06 53.87 67.86 75.89 78.27 81.55 84.52 92.56 95.54 127 
São Paulo 12.93 24.28 35.44 53.77 65.21 71.91 75.91 79.35 83.63 90.98 96.19 131 
S. Sebastião da Pedreira 6.23 11.29 16.26 28.81 51.81 67.90 75.82 80.45 83.32 85.43 87.87 171 
São Vicente de Fora 20.04 30.77 39.57 57.47 67.68 73.89 78.40 82.03 85.87 93.42 97.04 118 
Sé 16.62 29.22 36.73 53.62 68.10 76.14 80.16 83.38 85.79 91.42 94.64 123 
Socorro 18.84 31.96 42.24 59.70 70.55 76.60 82.19 85.05 89.84 96.35 99.09 102 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from Census 2001 - INE 
  
 
Annex VII 
Population and Families 
 
 
Non-
nuclear 
families 
One 
person 
families  
with ≥ 65 
years old 
Population 
≥ 65 year 
old 
population 
without ac
ademic 
qualificatio
n 
Population 
with 
higher 
education 
Population 
living with 
pension % 
Mainland 19.28% 8.87% 16.50% 11.38% 6.61% 20.20% 
North 14.89% 6.94% 13.96% 12.06% 5.22% 17.90% 
Center 19.34% 10.52% 19.45% 12.97% 5.29% 23.08% 
Lisbon 23.33% 8.64% 15.40% 8.97% 10.47% 18.94% 
Alentejo 21.30% 12.52% 22.34% 11.68% 4.46% 26.46% 
Algarve 23.28% 9.54% 18.63% 11.19% 5.68% 20.75% 
Grat Lisbon w/o Lisbon 20.46% 6.58% 12.61% 8.91% 9.58% 16.00% 
Lisbon City 34.22% 14.38% 23.61% 8.47% 17.18% 26.30% 
Ajuda 31.55% 14.24% 25.52% 9.45% 7.67% 31.45% 
Alcântara 37.33% 16.78% 29.00% 8.53% 13.37% 33.51% 
Alto do Pina 34.74% 14.32% 22.51% 8.06% 23.12% 23.34% 
Alvalade 38.54% 20.60% 35.27% 5.59% 28.61% 31.54% 
Ameixoeira 23.71% 6.68% 12.86% 10.28% 14.70% 17.34% 
Anjos 43.74% 19.15% 28.85% 8.32% 14.74% 30.75% 
Beato 31.77% 13.99% 23.16% 9.42% 9.65% 29.65% 
Benfica 29.99% 10.90% 21.15% 7.35% 18.34% 25.20% 
Campo Grande 35.24% 16.88% 28.57% 7.72% 18.57% 28.66% 
Campolide 35.57% 15.22% 23.95% 8.89% 11.72% 26.81% 
Carnide 21.41% 6.74% 13.48% 9.54% 16.86% 17.16% 
Castelo 42.70% 24.20% 30.66% 10.56% 5.28% 37.31% 
Charneca 17.60% 7.65% 12.56% 12.96% 1.35% 16.87% 
Coração de Jesus 54.43% 18.62% 27.48% 7.50% 19.19% 28.48% 
Encarnação 50.16% 20.07% 26.68% 9.59% 11.50% 29.20% 
Graça 38.42% 17.47% 29.63% 8.69% 11.25% 33.48% 
Lapa 38.16% 17.25% 27.94% 8.12% 25.21% 27.17% 
Lumiar 25.94% 5.98% 12.61% 7.01% 30.71% 14.89% 
Madalena 51.53% 17.86% 27.11% 7.37% 12.37% 29.21% 
Mártires 53.33% 13.33% 23.46% 11.73% 18.77% 21.11% 
Marvila 17.30% 7.29% 13.70% 11.72% 3.60% 20.24% 
Mercês 48.61% 21.24% 27.19% 9.46% 16.16% 29.28% 
Nossa Sra. de Fátima 40.81% 15.79% 27.20% 6.79% 26.62% 25.47% 
Pena 51.58% 19.19% 27.37% 9.71% 12.41% 29.65% 
Penha de França 39.91% 18.62% 29.67% 9.62% 12.22% 33.05% 
Prazeres 39.58% 15.29% 24.58% 8.71% 20.08% 27.18% 
Sacramento 55.16% 19.51% 24.43% 9.20% 16.25% 27.16% 
Santa Catarina 47.00% 20.23% 28.45% 9.02% 10.32% 32.05% 
Santa Engrácia 36.26% 15.96% 27.41% 8.34% 10.80% 31.45% 
Santa Isabel 40.65% 18.01% 28.28% 7.79% 21.87% 28.01% 
Santa Justa 49.40% 21.39% 32.43% 11.14% 6.29% 32.57% 
Santa Maria de Belém 34.92% 16.69% 28.70% 7.25% 19.02% 29.91% 
Santa Maria dos Olivais 22.41% 10.49% 24.23% 8.97% 12.89% 29.04% 
Santiago 41.45% 21.50% 31.62% 11.20% 10.50% 34.42% 
Santo Condestável 40.43% 18.77% 28.35% 8.60% 16.44% 30.11% 
Santo Estêvão 45.99% 23.48% 30.58% 10.55% 6.11% 37.71% 
Santos-o-Velho 41.53% 20.33% 28.13% 10.02% 13.61% 31.72% 
S. Cristóvão e S. Lourenço 53.11% 21.92% 27.61% 9.99% 7.94% 31.89% 
São Domingos de Benfica 32.50% 11.98% 20.82% 6.20% 27.97% 22.85% 
São Francisco Xavier 27.20% 9.87% 19.52% 6.34% 33.79% 19.00% 
São João 35.44% 16.98% 26.74% 9.44% 10.82% 30.24% 
São João de Brito 33.95% 18.45% 33.45% 6.65% 24.76% 31.14% 
São João de Deus 41.28% 21.23% 33.13% 5.39% 28.95% 29.91% 
São Jorge de Arroios 46.40% 19.20% 30.00% 7.53% 19.42% 29.96% 
São José 52.44% 20.43% 29.71% 9.98% 11.17% 31.76% 
São Mamede 46.29% 18.87% 27.93% 7.26% 26.73% 28.30% 
São Miguel 42.60% 19.74% 26.06% 11.82% 3.60% 32.58% 
São Nicolau 53.72% 22.87% 32.51% 8.68% 9.11% 32.94% 
São Paulo 42.29% 16.80% 24.74% 9.37% 9.86% 28.71% 
São Sebastião da Pedreira 43.87% 18.07% 29.26% 6.78% 29.23% 24.37% 
São Vicente de Fora 43.26% 19.27% 28.43% 9.61% 10.12% 34.45% 
Sé 46.34% 19.05% 29.74% 9.31% 13.02% 33.79% 
Socorro 45.97% 20.08% 25.94% 12.71% 4.71% 30.88% 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from Census 2001 - INE 
 
 
  
 
Annex VIII 
Population Fixation, Divisions in lack or Excess and Derelict 
Buildings 
 
 
Working 
or 
studying 
in the 
same 
borough 
Natural 
from the 
borough 
where 
actualy 
live 
Individual 
that live 
in the 
same 
borough 
since 
1995 
Index of 
divisions 
in excess 
Index of 
divisions 
in lack 
Partially 
derelict 
as % of 
2001 
total 
buildings 
Totally 
derelict 
as % of 
2001 
total 
buildings 
Buildings 
needing 
repairs 
2001 
Mainland 24.88% 47.92% 78.88% 0.95 0.22 
  
38.10% 
North 24.44% 53.17% 79.34% 0.91 0.21 
  
40.40% 
Center 27.56% 59.14% 82.52% 1.21 0.12 
  
37.30% 
Lisbon 19.92% 28.72% 73.81% 0.79 0.19 
  
38.80% 
Alentejo 30.67% 57.16% 84.04% 1.01 0.15 
  
35.10% 
Algarve 35.21% 43.52% 76.98% 0.88 0.19 
  
32.80% 
Grat Lisbon w/o Lisbon 20.47% 27.58% 72.16% 0.71 0.21 
  
36.18% 
Lisbon City 15.35% 26.73% 77.22% 0.99 0.17 5.27% 3.52% 55.90% 
Ajuda 14.32% 37.60% 84.09% 0.69 0.23 0.94% 3.69% 62.10% 
Alcântara 16.86% 30.55% 80.07% 0.88 0.17 1.14% 2.67% 68.00% 
Alto do Pina 11.23% 21.41% 74.48% 1.09 0.15 5.25% 1.93% 61.80% 
Alvalade 13.90% 21.21% 80.85% 1.36 0.12 3.95% 0.63% 66.30% 
Ameixoeira 11.34% 23.42% 74.38% 0.58 0.24 0.51% 3.04% 66.30% 
Anjos 11.97% 22.63% 75.27% 1.29 0.14 2.10% 5.10% 64.10% 
Beato 13.26% 31.28% 82.05% 0.66 0.25 3.16% 5.03% 48.20% 
Benfica 15.10% 27.29% 80.04% 0.83 0.17 1.88% 2.02% 37.20% 
Campo Grande 17.08% 24.05% 74.67% 1.27 0.12 0.48% 1.75% 36.30% 
Campolide 17.50% 32.22% 75.87% 0.76 0.26 0.70% 3.91% 65.00% 
Carnide 14.67% 22.29% 68.96% 0.67 0.22 0.54% 1.52% 78.00% 
Castelo 6.81% 47.36% 90.12% 0.43 0.30 8.85% 7.96% 25.60% 
Charneca 14.60% 28.18% 62.54% 0.39 0.31 0.68% 1.03% 59.80% 
Coração de Jesus 15.07% 23.20% 74.25% 1.38 0.14 5.26% 5.64% 61.80% 
Encarnação 15.93% 26.15% 76.52% 1.10 0.16 1.72% 3.02% 61.40% 
Graça 12.33% 26.59% 78.32% 0.99 0.16 18.75% 5.82% 53.60% 
Lapa 15.47% 28.63% 77.70% 1.32 0.14 12.30% 4.86% 60.40% 
Lumiar 17.03% 21.99% 69.02% 0.94 0.13 0.53% 1.44% 38.90% 
Madalena 11.05% 21.05% 76.05% 1.64 0.11 31.08% 12.16% 59.40% 
Mártires 17.89% 26.69% 72.73% 1.56 0.14 26.67% 21.67% 61.60% 
Marvila 19.84% 33.03% 82.27% 0.62 0.26 7.13% 4.39% 68.70% 
Mercês 14.39% 30.28% 77.05% 1.03 0.18 5.77% 2.04% 48.70% 
Nossa Senhora de Fátima 18.50% 23.86% 74.66% 1.36 0.14 4.90% 3.80% 44.10% 
Pena 11.24% 23.42% 74.98% 0.98 0.17 11.79% 3.39% 63.90% 
Penha de França 13.04% 26.56% 78.69% 0.88 0.17 0.98% 0.91% 64.30% 
Prazeres 17.52% 29.25% 73.82% 1.00 0.20 18.40% 9.02% 68.30% 
Sacramento 15.57% 23.64% 68.98% 1.11 0.14 14.62% 2.31% 74.60% 
Santa Catarina 12.72% 28.38% 79.20% 1.01 0.17 2.45% 4.29% 77.10% 
Santa Engrácia 8.23% 27.06% 77.82% 0.71 0.20 10.20% 2.74% 48.40% 
Santa Isabel 15.27% 27.36% 75.30% 1.10 0.17 12.36% 3.60% 54.90% 
Santa Justa 12.43% 19.00% 78.00% 1.09 0.15 43.92% 14.19% 78.30% 
Santa Maria de Belém 17.55% 28.15% 78.64% 1.17 0.15 2.79% 5.58% 46.80% 
Santa Maria dos Olivais 16.25% 24.83% 79.55% 1.05 0.16 0.39% 3.54% 38.40% 
Santiago 9.68% 33.37% 87.40% 0.92 0.19 24.40% 4.17% 54.70% 
Santo Condestável 16.75% 36.21% 80.81% 0.91 0.19 1.06% 1.64% 75.80% 
Santo Estêvão 8.45% 35.27% 84.03% 0.57 0.26 30.73% 11.45% 77.00% 
Santos-o-Velho 14.03% 39.35% 80.19% 1.12 0.18 12.23% 4.60% 58.80% 
S. Cristóvão e S. Lourenço 8.37% 27.36% 75.62% 0.77 0.24 10.53% 3.83% 60.70% 
São Domingos de Benfica 15.05% 20.84% 75.14% 0.94 0.15 11.65% 2.05% 42.60% 
São Francisco Xavier 15.85% 20.86% 74.83% 1.40 0.10 0.10% 2.81% 25.00% 
São João 12.73% 28.51% 79.95% 0.74 0.21 1.45% 1.72% 64.70% 
São João de Brito 14.21% 22.72% 82.65% 1.44 0.11 10.83% 2.49% 29.70% 
São João de Deus 14.68% 20.54% 78.71% 1.61 0.11 0.37% 3.05% 44.40% 
São Jorge de Arroios 16.60% 23.39% 75.99% 1.35 0.13 2.93% 2.81% 62.80% 
São José 12.69% 24.62% 76.94% 1.06 0.15 20.04% 7.75% 69.70% 
São Mamede 13.72% 22.73% 73.68% 1.51 0.11 17.56% 6.54% 39.00% 
São Miguel 9.06% 40.41% 80.87% 0.45 0.31 26.07% 3.30% 44.50% 
São Nicolau 11.91% 20.51% 73.62% 1.46 0.11 25.62% 6.20% 57.40% 
São Paulo 15.54% 29.20% 77.73% 1.10 0.17 19.41% 12.03% 59.00% 
São Sebastião da Pedreira 18.99% 28.67% 75.95% 1.84 0.14 18.23% 4.70% 52.80% 
São Vicente de Fora 13.78% 29.48% 78.46% 0.76 0.19 1.75% 3.50% 57.10% 
Sé 10.60% 25.69% 77.50% 1.47 0.14 26.84% 5.79% 82.60% 
Socorro 12.56% 31.21% 81.79% 0.75 0.26 4.42% 2.72% 80.70% 
Source: Author Computations based on Data from Census 2001 – INE; 
             Derelict buildings from Direcção Municipal de Conservação e Reabilitação Urbana 
 
 
 
 
  
Annex IX 
Rent Actualizations Grew in line with the Price index and 
conservation costs since 2005, just above the House market 
index for New Houses 
 
 
 
Source: Price Index and Conservation Costs - Author Computations based on Data from  INE. 
Actualization coefficients computed from factors in “Portal Habitação” 
CI index Author computations based on data from Confidencial Imobiliário 
 
 
Annex X 
Correction coefficients to apply in the first update in 1986 
year of last 
rent fixation 
Municipalities of Lisbon and Oporto 
Others 
Municipalities 
Inflation Index 
Until 1986 
w/o gate and 
w/o lift 
w/o gate 
and w/ lift 
w/ gate and 
w/o lift 
w/ gate and 
w/ lift 
Before 1960 3.15 3.45 3.7 4 
2.1 
 
1060 2.95 3.2 3.45 3.7 
 
1961 2.6 2.75 2.95 3.1 4.091 
1962 2.5 2.6 2.75 2.9 4.077 
1963 2.5 2.6 2.75 2.9 4.07 
1964 2.35 2.5 2.6 2.7 4.064 
1965 2.25 2.3 2.4 2.5 4.044 
1966 1.95 2 2.05 2.1 4.005 
1967 1.9 3.952 
1968 1.8 3.913 
1969 1.8 2.1 3.896 
1970 1.7 1.9 3.822 
1971 1.7 1.9 3.804 
1972 1.65 1.85 3.754 
1973 1.6 1.8 3.676 
1974 1.5 1.5 3.581 
1975 1.45 1.45 3.392 
1976 1.4 1.4 3.23 
1977 1.31 1.31 3.067 
1978 1.27 1.27 2.793 
1979 1.21 1.21 2.573 
Source:  Inflation Index Author Computations based on Inflation excluding Housing Data from INE 
until 1977, before from Inflation Data from Google. 
Actualization coefficients from Law nº 46/86  
98
100
102
104
106
108
110
112
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CI index Lisbon Metropolitan Area -
New
CI index Lisbon Metropolitan Area -
Used
CI index Mainland - New
CI index Mainland - Used
Price index 2005=100
Actualization index 2006=100
Lisbon Conservation Cost index
2005=100
 
Annex XI 
Auxiliary Model to test the effects of some of the most 
relevant variables 
 
Source: Author Computation (Data from INE)  
Annex XII - Explanation for auxiliary model 
 
The table presents the estimates for each quartile, where for each one, was estimated 3 
different models. Each explanatory variable was expressed as percentage of the total of the 
belonging group, with different values for each borough, where each group has an omitted 
variable, so each of the coefficients should be compared with the omitted variable. For example 
to the first group which expresses the percentage for each type of occupation on the total of 
occupied as usual residence familiar classic dwellings, the variable omitted is the owner 
occupied dwelling percentage, so each coefficient should, ceteris paribus, be analyzed as a trade 
of between the omitted variable, so an increase in the limited rent contract percentage will be at 
the cost of an equal decrease in the owner occupied percentage. For the percentage of familiar 
classic dwellings will be the percentage of occupied as usual residence. Exception to this is the 
Accumulated of charges with own house purchase, because all quartile values are accumulated 
(variable similar to the explained variable). Also for the group of variables contemplated in 
model 3 which are binary variables for each peripheral perimeter where the omitted variable is 
the central boroughs. I started the model with a greater number of variables, then excluding the 
groups of variables less relevant and with strange results, as house facilities, as electricity, 
sewage or water, since almost the percentage of dwellings without it are so low that it doesn’t 
have the right expression in a model with aggregate percentages. Also there are some groups of 
variables that are related and take the effects from other group of variables, it’s the case of the 
contract date, the borough line and the buildings date, so the first ones aren’t treated together, 
instead they are in different models to reveal and prove some issues. 
Before moving to the interpretation of coefficients there are one thing needing to know, a 
positive coefficient means that if the weight of the variable change in one percentage point the 
accumulated quartile (explained variable) will increase by the coefficient times one percentage 
point, while the accumulate quartile increases the more dwellings we have above the 
corresponding rent level, so as cheap are the rents. Then one negative coefficient implies a rent 
increase. The accumulated  of charges with own house purchase have the same coefficient 
interpretation as others variables, but we must have in attention that when it increases means 
that we have lower charges. 
Having a look at model1 for the first quartile of rent values (also analyzing the other eight 
models since some results are similar), we could see that as greater is the weight of limited rent 
contracts the higher will be the rent values of the first quartile for that borough the same applies 
to all other 8 models. This is due to the mechanism of demand and supply, as greater are the 
demand for rent, the higher will be the rent costs. Then we have to compare this value with the 
weight of unlimited rent contracts, which have a lower impact on rent increase and with a very 
low significance, that is due to the fact that limited contract rents are much more dynamic as 
unlimited rent contracts and practiced at a rent value much more updated and market reflective, 
while unlimited rent contracts tend to be much similar as owner occupied, due to the long use of 
housing service, it is almost as there was some houses less in the rent market and as it were a 
great percentage in the rent market, it is establishing the most of rent values, so the differences 
in the prices will be mainly due to other types of contracts. We could find evidence of rent 
control effects on those two variables, because if unlimited rent contracts have values updated 
close to the market as it was the limited rent contract, then both variables will have a similar 
value, but instead, having more rent limited houses increases the rent value. Social rent 
contracts are significant and as higher the percentage the lower will be the rents, which is 
understandable. Subletting has few significance in some models maybe because it is not so 
much expressive as are rent contracts but its negative coefficient corresponds also to the demand 
supply mechanism, as greater is the demand of subletting the greater will be the rents and its 
value is very close to market value. Other Non-owner cases when significant have a great 
impact in rent increase since it means one less unit to rent in the market, usually from unlimited 
rent contracts taken to landlords own residence then used by familiars. 
Then sometimes significant is unoccupied for sale with a positive value, which I believe 
that is due to the fact that as rent contracts are lower, owners prefer to sell the house instead of 
renting. Unoccupied seems to have a strange behavior, but in a market with lack of rent supply, 
having unoccupied rent units, means that they could be very unsound, so less dwellings are in 
the market and greater will be the rents, also for unoccupied to demolish, very significant since 
it means less supply, also it can contemplates for positive signal in rent price due to 
rehabilitation borough programs. 
 
Strange could be see that old building dates percentage makes the rent price increase, but 
not if we understand that for older ones that increase in price is lower and that the omitted 
variable is building date after 1991, where the high percentage of building up was in the 
periphery, where the prices are lower, we can confirm that by introducing the periphery binary 
variables in the model, it takes some strength of those variables in detriment of a positive 
coefficient for peripheral boroughs meaning lower rents. The high value of increase in rent price 
for weights of 1981 to 1990 construction is due to the fact that the construction in that period 
slowed down in the peripheries being mainly in the centered in areas where the prices are 
higher. According to the number of dwellings in the buildings it seems that the expensive ones 
have 5 to 9 dwellings. 
Rent prices are correlated with first quartile of charges with own house, they move 
together, but more expressive explaining the first quartile of rent prices. Although charges with 
own rent have less than proportional impact. 
 The number of divisions has impact on the rent value as expected, where having more than 
nine divisions seems to be devaluating. For first quartile seems to be proportional the number of 
divisions and the increase in price, for third quartile the 7 and 8 divisions are more appreciated 
(costly). 
According to contract date when used in the model of first and third quartile it takes some 
strength of limited and unlimited rent contract variables, because it have a similar interpretation, 
for older contracts rent level is lower, another rent control evidence, for the first quartile, as it is 
much correlated with older contracts, they seem to have no evidence, because it is a given data 
of the “first quartile market” so instead of being significant, the more significant is the 1987 to 
1991 rent contract date, having a positive impact in the prices. For other quartiles, are the older 
contract dates the ones most significant with a negative impact on rent price. 
For the second quartile the evidence is for the model2, which translates the chronic 
situation caused by rent controls. With prior to 1975 taking all the evidence (from limited or 
unlimited rent contract), as well as unoccupied for sale and unoccupied to demolish, which are 
the chronic effects of rent control. The price of dwellings between 5 and 8 divisions, were used 
by the old tenants with capacity gap according to their needs, being ones of the most occupied 
becoming scarcer and costly. The borough 3
rd
 line being an expensive area, have a significant 
impact on second and third quartile. The third quartile seem to be an extreme market, with 
limited rent contract having a great impact on price, unlimited contract makes the price decrease 
as well as social rents, while the evidence goes to 7 or 8 divisions in buildings of 10 to 15 
dwellings. 
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Annex XIV 
Market Values and 2001 Average contracted values compared 
 
 
2010 estimated values 
values deflated by 
actualization index to 2001  
 
Market rent 
value 
rent value 
according 
to the 0,4% 
of Dwelling 
for sell 
value 
Market rent 
value 
rent value 
according to 
the 0,4% sell 
value of 
Dwelling 
average 
rent in 
2001 
difference 
from 0,4% 
of sell 
value in 
2010 
deflated 
difference 
from rent 
value in 
2010 
deflated 
Lisbon Average 640.3736 600.7907 502.6728 471.6014 123.18 348.0916 379.163 
Ajuda 564.3582 508.6218 443.0031 399.2518 81 318.2518 362.0031 
Alcântara 625.6131 525.4795 491.0862 412.4845 106 306.4845 385.0862 
Alto do Pina 584.0591 555.4825 458.4677 436.0359 136 300.0359 322.4677 
Alvalade 612.8434 631.286 481.0624 495.5393 147 348.5393 334.0624 
Ameixoeira 581.4626 540.8914 456.4295 424.5824 91 333.5824 365.4295 
Anjos 508.2904 472.5537 398.9917 370.9395 138 232.9395 260.9917 
Beato 499.9573 451.8746 392.4505 354.707 99 255.707 293.4505 
Benfica 517.3723 525.1682 406.1207 412.2402 118 294.2402 288.1207 
Campo Grande 756.2337 769.4871 593.6192 604.0227 126 478.0227 467.6192 
Campolide 727.6657 671.4071 571.1943 527.033 114 413.033 457.1943 
Carnide 673.8101 648.0963 528.9193 508.7348 64 444.7348 464.9193 
Castelo 633.0668 479.4972 496.9371 376.3899 54 322.3899 442.9371 
Charneca 
    
75 
 
 Coração de Jesus 784.9736 773.9703 616.1791 607.5419 138 469.5419 478.1791 
Encarnação 631.1706 581.7909 495.4487 456.6872 136 320.6872 359.4487 
Graça 579.0348 537.4128 454.5238 421.8518 111 310.8518 343.5238 
Lapa 706.0909 672.7156 554.2587 528.0602 155 373.0602 399.2587 
Lumiar 674.0177 655.1102 529.0823 514.2405 150 364.2405 379.0823 
Madalena 669.0671 444.203 525.1962 348.6851 147 201.6851 378.1962 
Mártires 
    
155 
 
 Marvila 619.3644 559.3245 486.1812 439.0518 55 384.0518 431.1812 
Mercês 705.3729 602.7101 553.6951 473.1081 129 344.1081 424.6951 
Nossa Senhora de 
Fátima 727.3393 652.4528 570.9381 512.1545 161 351.1545 409.9381 
Pena 474.899 465.1443 372.7805 365.1234 146 219.1234 226.7805 
Penha de França 518.8134 492.4008 407.2519 386.5189 118 268.5189 289.2519 
Prazeres 588.5605 536.3375 462.0011 421.0077 113 308.0077 349.0011 
Sacramento 587.8128 534.3068 461.4142 419.4137 154 265.4137 307.4142 
Santa Catarina 629.9467 564.3783 494.488 443.0189 128 315.0189 366.488 
Santa Engrácia 553.4683 525.1485 434.4549 412.2248 121 291.2248 313.4549 
Santa Isabel 731.5048 768.6681 574.2079 603.3799 140 463.3799 434.2079 
Santa Justa 1232.292 767.8449 967.3098 602.7336 104 498.7336 863.3098 
Santa Maria de 
Belém 638.3843 583.136 501.1112 457.7431 105 352.7431 396.1112 
Santa Maria dos 
Olivais 806.0108 672.1884 632.6927 527.6464 79 448.6464 553.6927 
Santiago 485.1947 744.9643 380.8623 584.7731 84 500.7731 296.8623 
Santo Condestável 569.7581 563.2524 447.2418 442.1351 130 312.1351 317.2418 
Santo Estêvão 548.9006 449.9142 430.8694 353.1682 86 267.1682 344.8694 
Santos-o-Velho 697.3356 649.6979 547.3861 509.992 116 393.992 431.3861 
São Cristóvão e 
São Lourenço 584.5578 472.2536 458.8592 370.704 110 260.704 348.8592 
São Domingos de 
Benfica 644.9558 659.5004 506.2696 517.6867 143 374.6867 363.2696 
São Francisco 
Xavier 674.2977 691.1656 529.3021 542.5428 214 328.5428 315.3021 
São João 562.8073 543.5916 441.7857 426.7019 114 312.7019 327.7857 
São João de Brito 598.3511 722.8705 469.6864 567.4302 137 430.4302 332.6864 
São João de Deus 532.0353 594.695 417.6306 466.8165 165 301.8165 252.6306 
São Jorge de 
Arroios 577.8689 586.9341 453.6085 460.7245 155 305.7245 298.6085 
São José 573.4419 562.8827 450.1335 441.8449 137 304.8449 313.1335 
São Mamede 793.6957 921.4468 623.0257 723.3062 177 546.3062 446.0257 
São Miguel 508.4675 486.7989 399.1307 382.1215 95 287.1215 304.1307 
São Nicolau 1035.512 845.0814 812.8437 663.3618 127 536.3618 685.8437 
São Paulo 697.0522 556.136 547.1637 436.5489 131 305.5489 416.1637 
São Sebastião da 
Pedreira 854.7966 824.681 670.9879 647.3482 171 476.3482 499.9879 
São Vicente de 
Fora 519.108 478.4359 407.4831 375.5569 118 257.5569 289.4831 
Sé 674.5668 699.9794 529.5134 549.4614 123 426.4614 406.5134 
Socorro 383.4947 416.953 301.031 327.2947 102 225.2947 199.031 
 
Source: Average rent in 2001 from INE  
 Actualization coefficients computed from factors in “Portal Habitação”  
 Market values computed from 2010 square meter value times an average of offered area in 
2010 and 2009 for apartments T1 or less from Lardocelar – Confidencia Imobiliário  
 
Annex XV 
 International Monetary Fund wants houses to be more 
expensive 
 
 
Source: Diário de Notícias 
 
 
  
 
Annex XVI 
Each time more difficult to pay rent and provision of house 
 
 Source: Diário de Notícias 
 
 
Annex XVII 
International Monetary Fund will strengthen the resurgence 
of the rental market 
 
 
Source: Diário Económico 
 
 
 
  
Annex XVIII 
Portugal’s Towns Crumble as Century Old Rent Controls 
Strangle Investment 
 

 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
Annex XIX 
REMAX closes deal with banking to sell seized properties 
 
 
Source: Remax Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Annex XX 
Revaluations press the rise of old rents 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex XXI - Structural improvement of the buildings eases 
evictions 
 
 
 
  
 
Annex XXII - Five years later, fiscal evaluation asked in 2 of 
each 100 old rents 
 
 
Source: MaisActual.pt 
